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Abstract
JavaScript language, through its dynamic feature, provides user interactivity with websites. It also pose serious security threats to
both user and website. On top of this, obfuscation is widely used to hide its malicious purpose and to evade the detection of antivirus
software. Malware embedded in web pages is regularly used as part of targeted attacks. To hinder detection by antivirus scanners,
the malicious code is usually obfuscated, often with encodings like hexadecimal, unicode, base64, escaped characters and rarely
with substitution ciphers like Vigenere, Caesar and Atbash. The malicious iframes are injected to the websites using JavaScript and
are also made hidden from the users perspective in-order to prevent detection. To defend against obfuscated malicious JavaScript
code, we propose a mostly static approach called, AMA, Amrita Malware Analyzer, a framework capable of detecting the presence
of malicious code through static code analysis of web page. To this end, the framework performs probable plaintext attack using
strings likely contained in malicious web pages. But this approach targets only few among many possible obfuscation strategies.
The evaluation based on the links provided in the Malware domain list demonstrates high level accuracy
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ICACC 2016.
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1. Introduction
JavaScript is an interpreted programming language embedded into web pages with the aim of providing user
interactivity and dynamic content. Upon loading a webpage, the web browser, parses, compiles, and executes scripts
(eg: JavaScript, ActionScript, ActiveX etc) in the page. Users browser, extensions and plugins are the major attack
surface for attackers. Malicious JavaScript programs can take advantage of execution in the foreign environment
containing possible browser-related vulnerabilities. By doing so, it lures the victim into clicking on a link hosted by a
malicious host. For example, drive-by-download attack[2] downloads and executes malware onto the browser.
JavaScript/DOM based attacks have been reported as top Internet security threats in recent years [1] [4] [14] [13]. Most
internet users rely on the protection provided by antivirus software as it militates against the malware attacks. Obfus-
cation technique is considered to be an eﬀective way of hiding malicious intent of JavaScript code, mainly due to the
following reasons: First, obfuscation could easily evade the static signature-based detection techniques like antivirus
and IDS. Second, change in the signature of the code during runtime could be achieved by using the dynamic code
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generation and runtime evaluation functionalities of JavaScript. In fact, recent trends suggest that, attackers have been
increasingly applying obfuscation techniques to evade the anti-virus detection and to conceal its malicious intent [2] [3].
Several approaches [6] [7] [8] [2] [16] [3] focus on the detection of malicious Javascript code through either static or
dynamic analysis or combination of both [14]. These approaches either adopt machine learning techniques or perform
runtime analysis. Machine learning techniques proven to give better results, achieve high accuracy, with a large
set of features. However, most approaches do not make any attempts to deobfuscate the embedded code, to detect
the presence of malicious code, hence easily evaded. On the contrary, dynamic analysis can expose the malicious
behavior of JavaScript during runtime, but the performance overhead is the major factor preventing its day-to- day
and large-scale use.
In this work, we propose AMA, a static code analyzer of malicious scripts in the web page. AMA analyzes certain
HTML elements and JavaScript code, detects the presence of obfuscated code, and identiﬁes the ones that can be
potentially malicious AMA by launching a probable plaintext attack on the deobfuscated code. This work uses an
existing classiﬁcation method[11] to statically analyze the web page based on the initial HTTP response from the
given URL.
In the evaluation of AMA, we use links provided in Malware Domain List [10] as malicious sample set to test
the correctness of the framework. The evaluation report shows that AMA has a small number of true negatives.
Application of this method shows signiﬁcant performance gain over other approaches.
2. Contribution
Our work makes the following contributions:
1. Only static detection of obfuscated malicious code: AMA is a lightweight, only static approach to detect
(obfuscated) malicious scripts, most of which evade the detection of state-of-art anti-virus software.
2. Probable plaintext attack: AMA detects limited types (escape, hex, Caesar, Atbash and Vigenere) of obfusca-
tion techniques and launches a probable plaintext attack on deobfuscated strings to test whether the given sample
is a malware or not.
3. Background
3.1. Attack Methodologies
Attackers use a variety of techniques to compromise and inject malicious code into web pages. The recent incidents
of malicious advertisement attacks in Yahoo, Youtube and Dailymotion shows the use of highly eﬀective iframe
based web attacks. An invisible iframe has redirected the Daliymotion websites’ users to the exploit serving bogus
anti-virus malware page[22]. iframes are used for loading dynamic content in a webpage from other source. iframe
based attacks suggest that attackers need not always compromise the servers serving advertisements. Attackers could
redirect the users using malicious iframe embedded in a web page. Hence attackers embed hidden iframes into the
page to trick a legitimate user redirect to a malicious page.
Listing 1: Examples of hidden iFrame malwares
< i frame width=” 700 ” he igh t=” 500 ” frameborder=”0” s r c=” h t t p : / / f a cebook . cn ”
v i s i b i l i t y =” f a l s e ”>
< i frame width=”0” he igh t=”0” frameborder=”0” s r c=” h t t p : / / f a cebook . cn ”
v i s i b i l i t y =” t r u e ”>
Listing 1 illustrate examples of hidden iframes. The ﬁrst iframe is invisible because its HTML attribute visibility
is set as false. The second iframe has zero width and height.
The Mozilla developer community considers the JavaScript function eval() as dangerous[14], which executes the
code it’s passed with the privileges of the caller. If there’s an eval() function in a page with a string that could
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be aﬀected by malicious party, it may end up running malicious code on the user’s device with browser/extension’s
permission. Presence of eval() can be classiﬁed as suspicious. Listing 2 shows an example of sample obfuscated
JavaScript code which injects a hidden iframe into the web page.
Listing 2: Obfuscated code
< s c r i p t> e v a l ( unescape (’%64%6F%63%75%6D%65%6E%74%2E %77%72%69%. . . . . . ( some
by t e s s k i pped ) . . . . . . . 3 E%3C%2F%69%66%72%61%6D%65%3E%27%29’) ) ; < / s c r i p t>
Listing 3: Deobfuscated code
document . w r i t e ( ’< i frame src=” h t t p : / / sedpoo . com /?338375 ” width=0 he igh t=0>
< / i frame> ’ ) ;
4. Overview
This section gives an overview on the design of AMA.
4.1. Function Invocation Based Analysis
AMA is designed in such way that the deobfuscated or plaintext code has to contain any of the following HTML




iframe Malicious src domain, visibility attribute set as false and dimensions
(width/height) less than one
img Malicious src domain
script Malicious src domain
eval() Presence of obfuscated code, injecting a plaintext code with invisible or hidden iframe
and presence of shellcode
unescape() Analyzing the string argument, presence of code injecting invisible or hidden iframe and
presence of shellcode
Table 1: Suspicious behaviour of HTML attributes and JavaScript
The challenge here is to distinguish function invocations in obfuscated malicious code from that in benign code.
AMA is selective about functions in which obfuscated strings are passed as arguments. Figure 1 demonstrates the
decision tree of the AMA. It checks for the presence of iframes, its visibility and the domain of URL in the iframe.
Analyzer also uses Google Safe Browsing API[24] to check whether the src domain of the URLs of either iframe,
img, web page or script sources are blacklisted.
Most of the malicious samples which was collected from the Malware Domain List, contains obfuscated scripts
wrapped by a user deﬁned function, and called inside from an eval() function, in-order to execute at the user’s
browser. The JavaScript coding guidelines [14] does not promote the use of eval functions in major open source
projects. Thus, our proposed system assumes that the presence of eval() function is considered as suspicious. But
AMA does further role in detecting the presence of malicious code inside eval() either as plaintext or obfuscated.
Our system uses bruteforce technique in detecting the type of obfuscation and deobfuscates using probable plaintext
attack.
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Fig. 1: Decision Tree for malicious iframe and escape string detection
4.2. Plaintext attack on deobfuscated strings
Our system deobfuscates obfuscated strings, it tries to classify whether the plaintext string is malicious or not. It
maintains a list of sample malicious scripts’ word frequency distribution table in the database. Whenever a test web
page is provided, the deobfuscated strings are tokenized and its word frequency distribution table is calculated. Not
all words from the sample malware list are used by the malware analyzer, instead, it selects top 20% of the total words
from a sample malware word frequency list.
Fig. 2: Decision tree for launching probable plain-text attacks on encodings and simple substitution ciphers
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N = 0.2 ×WordCount(MalWordListi) (1)
Our malware analyzer pre-calculates the threshold value by adding up the scores of the top 20% words chosen





Once the threshold of sample is calculated, analyzer checks if the words mentioned in the sample word list are
present in the testing list. If present, then it sums up the frequency of the words in the testing list. After going through
the 20% of the words from the sample word lists, AMA checks if the threshold of the testing list if greater than
the precalculated threshold. If it is greater, it ﬂags the testing list as malicious, otherwise moves to the next sample
malicious word list for repeating the same step until all the malicious word lists are covered.
5. Evaluation
We deployed our system locally, tested the detection rate, calculated false positives and false negatives. We have
collected more than 5000 malware page links from Malware Domain List. We collected 789 malwares consisting
of malicious iframe, eval(), fromCharCode(), unescape() and images, our system has detected 143 as benign.
From top 1000 Alexa benign websites, our system has wrongly detected 46 malicious URLs. Out of 1789 URLs, our
system wrongly classiﬁed 189 URLs, with around 89% accuracy.
Tested Benign URLs Tested Malicious URLs Total tested URLs
1000 789 1789
Detected as Malicious URLs 46 143 189
Detected as Benign URLs 954 646 1600
False Positive: 4.6% False Negative: 18.1% Accuracy: 89.44%
Table 2: Testing results
6. Related Work
Several approaches have been proposed to detect Malicious JavaScript and HTML elements in the web page.
JStill [14] detects malicious JavaScript code by function invocation based analysis, using a combination of both static
and lightweight dynamic analysis. WANG et al [15] analyzes and extracts malicious script features, using the machine
learning technology, SVM. NOZZLE[16] does a runtime analysis of the script code for the detection of heap- spray
exploits in the web page. ZOZZLE[17] uses Bayesian classiﬁcation of hierarchical features to identify JavaScript
syntax elements that suspicious. Prophiler [3] uses static analysis technique to quickly analyze the content of a web
page and ﬁlter out benign elements using machine learning techniques. There are tools like Google Safe Browsing
API[24], McAfee Siteadvisor [25], DeFusinator [26] and Traﬃclight addon[27] to detect malicious elements in the web
page. Most of these tools use the cloud database for checking the malicious URLs and require the frequent updation of
their database. Our proposed system aims at protecting the user from zero day attacks as it is a content based malware
ﬁltering solution.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, Amrita Malware Analyzer is presented for analyzing and detecting malicious HTML elements and
JavaScript code in the web pages. To surpass the anti-virus detection, the web malwares are usually obfuscated. This
work uses a simple classiﬁcation method for detecting malicious web pages that requires assessing attributes of the
HTTP response. AMA, a framework that eﬃciently deobfuscates the web malwares using probable plaintext attack.
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Our framework is currently deployed as a standalone web application. It could be also used as a browser extension
to inspect the incoming web pages. AMA provides detailed analysis report of the page including the geographical
location of the website and javascripts, images and iframes of the page.
The classiﬁcation method used in our framework is based on common attributes of malicious pages, attackers
could evade the detection mechanism by changing the structure of the page. For instance, a malicious page will not
get detected by our framework if the exploit is not imported via an iframe or Javascript eg: the VML exploit [12]. The
deobfuscation of various cryptographic ciphers will be explored as part of future work. This approach targets only
few among many possible obfuscation strategies, it helps to strengthen current defenses against web malwares.
Based on the evaluation, AMA gives signiﬁcant accuracy and performance in detection of malicious web pages
listed in Malware Domain List.
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